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here exists a growing view that local 
communities and beneficiaries should  be 
involved in the development, implementation, 
and monitoring of interventions designed to reduce 
poverty. One motivation for this view is that 
beneficiary participation carries with it intrinsic 
value; that is, there is inherent value in ensuring that 
individuals have a voice in activities that will affect 
their well being. Further, participation can con-
tribute to empowerment, such as that gained through 
enhanced organizational capacity, individual learn-
ing processes, or increased political voice. 
This  paper addresses whether, in addition to its 
intrinsic value, participation serves an instrumental 
function—does it enhance the efficacy of interven-
tions designed to reduce poverty? 
 
Understanding the Mechanism Through Which 
Community Participation Improves Antipoverty 
Interventions 
The paper begins by laying out a simple analytical 
framework for discussing the issues and uses this as 
a basis for placing a body of literature that has 
grown up around the topic. At 
the heart of this framework is 
a trichotomy, three actors 
involved in the provision of 
antipoverty interventions: fi-
nanciers (those who provide 
funds for an intervention), 
providers (those who imple-
ment interventions), and bene-
ficiaries. In this three-actor 
context, participation is a 
process by which benefici-
aries become involved in provision, and possibly 
finance. 
What happens when the poor move from being 
passive beneficiaries to being closely involved in the 
provision of interventions? One benefit of bene-
ficiary participation lies in the prospect of reducing 
costs. This is likely to occur where knowledge of 
local conditions is especially important, where moral 
hazard or adverse selection concerns play a role, or 
where verification of actions is needed. Com-
munities may also have ways of lowering costs that 
are not available to outsiders. A further benefit is 
that beneficiary participation offers the potential for 
the design and implementation of interventions that 
more closely reflect the preferences of the 
population that they are designed to serve. That said, 
there is a risk that emphasis on community 
participation—for example, by requiring up-front 
contributions by communities themselves—may 
result in a reduction in the number of projects that 
reach the poorest of the poor. There is also a risk that 
community participation may result in the capture of 
benefits by local elites, again to the detriment of the 
poor. Faced with such a concern, financiers may be 
tempted to exert control over projects. But this may 
be self-defeating. The failure to delegate true 
decision-making authority (allowing for de jure but 
not de facto participation) may result in beneficiaries 
being reluctant to act because of concerns that they 
will be subsequently overruled. Further, akin to 
problems sometimes en-
countered with pure de-
centralization, devolving 
all aspects of implemen-
tation to communities 
may not be desirable. The 
paper presents evidence 
that suggests that anti-
poverty interventions 
work best when their 
implementation is 
charac-terized by a 
judicious mix o f centralized involvement and 
community partici-pation. 
 
The South Africa Case Study 
This analytical framework is complemented by an 
econometric case study of the implementation of 
public  works  projects   in  South  Africa’s  Western 
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“De facto participation lowers the 
ratio of project to local wages…; 
increases the labor intensity of 
projects that provide community 
buildings, roads, or sewers; and 
lowers the cost of creating 
employment and of transferring funds 
to poor individuals.”  
Cape Province. The  data come from a study 
conducted between 1996 and 1998 by IFPRI and the 
Southern Africa Labour and Development Research 
Unit (SALDRU) at the University of Cape Town.  
  This study collected project-level quantitative and 
qualitative data on, among other things, diverse 
institutional arrangements between government, 
communities, and the private sector. A unique 
feature of these data is that it is possible to identify 
variations in both  de jure and  de facto levels of 
participation. In addition to a wide number of 
controls for locality characteristics, this study 
collected extensive data on project outcomes, 
including the ability of the projects to utilize 
publicly provided funds in a cost-efficient manner 
(the amount spent to create one day of employment; 
the cost to the government of transferring funds to 
the poor; and the level of cost overruns), the extent 
to which project benefits flow to individuals in the 
form of wages and training, and the extent to which 
these projects target particular groups within these 
localities. 
  Two issues underlie the estimation strategy used in 
this paper: the need to take into account a number of 
econometric concerns (notably, nonrandom program 
placement and the endogeneity of community 
participation). Evidence is presented that shows that 
there is no correlation between the localities in 
which projects were sited and observable character-
istics of those communities. Measures of community 
fractionalization—such as the extent of racial and 
political diversity—are used to predict the likelihood 
of community  participation  in these projects. These 
variables are found to have strong associations with 
the likelihood of participation while generally 
having no direct impact on project outcomes. 
However, accounting for program placement and the 
endogeneity of participation has little effect on the 
parameter estimates that are obtained. 
  By contrast, how participation is measured is 
particularly important. In general, measures of  de 
jure  participation are less strongly associated with 
project outcomes than are measures of  de facto 
participation. De facto participation lowers the ratio 
of project to local wages (provided selectivity biases 
are taken into account); increases the labor intensity 
of projects that provide community buildings,  roads, 
or sewers; and lowers the cost of creating em-
ployment and of transferring funds to poor 
individuals. There is weak evidence to suggest that 
where communities advise but do not make 
decisions, the percentage of employment going to 
women rises. There was no evidence that community 
participation increases cost overruns or the ratio of 
training to employment created, an exception to the 
former being the case of environmental improve-
ment activities (where the effect is not especially 
well measured). The general conclusion is that in 
these projects,  de facto  community participation is 
associated with improved project cost effectiveness 
and better targeting towards the poor. 
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